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STATE STATUTES AND ADMIRALTY.
One of the most interesting and at the same time one of the
most perplexing questions which the admiralty lawyer has to an-
swer is in relation to State Statutes giving and attempting to give
actions against vessels.
In many of the states bordering upon navigable waters
statutes have been enacted providing for liens for the building, re-
pairing and supplying of vessels. The statutes have generally been
enacted without any regard for the exclusive jurisdiction of admir-
alty in certain cases growing out of actions against vessels, without
any distinction being made between domestic and foreign vessels
or without any thought but that state courts might enforce actions
in rem against vessels in all instances. The confusion and litiga-
tion which have resulted from such statutes have in many instances
made "confusion vorse confounded" to those who are not familiar
with maritime law. This confusion from these misleading statutes
is not confined to laymen having dealings with vessels, but it is
very troublesome to a state court practitioner when called upon to
give any advice to a client in regard to these matters.
Since The Lottawanna, (2 Wall. 558), it has been a recognized
province of the states to provide for a lien against a domestic
vessel for supplies and repairs and provide'for its enforcement in
the admiralty courts, but to provide for liens against a foreign
vessel or against all vessels is in direct conflict with the admiralty
jurisdiction; for admiralty gives action in rem against a foreign
vessel.
This question was only recently before the Supreme Court of
the United States where the State of Washington attempted by
statutes to create liens on ocean-going vessels for work done and
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materials furnished on the order of a contractor and provided that
a lien could be enforced any time within three years and also for
the enforcement of this lien in admiralty. The Supreme Court
held the act unconstitutional as an unlawful interference with the
exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. In this case the
vessel was owned in Illinois and was subject to a lien under the
general maritime law which could have been enforced at any time
and these statutes attempted to make the lien good for three years,
while the general rule of admiralty recognizes no time for which
a lien shall be good, but does require one to pursue his claim with
reasonable diligence, and the reason for this must be obvious, for
a vessel trading in different ports, supply and material men have
a right to suppose she is worthy of credit and not subject to any
state liens.
The Court in commenting on the question whether materials
and labor furnished to a contractor constitute a lien upon
a vessel said the following: "There is a general consensus of
opinion in the state courts and in the inferior federal courts that
labor and materials furnished to a contractor do not constitute a
lien upon the vessel unless at least notice be given by the owner
of such claim before the contractor has received the sum stipulated
by his contract." (The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185, 47 L. Ed. 770.)
It will be interesting to observe that these statutes also pro-
vide for the construction of a vessel and provide for an enforce-
ment of the lien in admiralty. While this question was not be-
fore the Court, until People's Ferry Company v. Beers, (2o How.
393. 15 L. Ed. 961,) is overruled, which decides flatly that con-
tracts for the construction of a vessel are not maritime, it must
be apparent that these statutes, so far as they apply to the con-
struction of a vessel, and enforcement of a lien for such con-
struction in the admiralty, are void.
It has long been the contention of some of the text writers,
notably Mr. Benedict and Mr. Hughes, (Benedict on Admiralty,
Sec. 265 A. ; Hughes on Admiralty, p. io6), that there is no sound
reason why a contract for building a vessel is not just as much mar-
itime as a contract for repairing her. The contract for repairing a
vessel has nothing to do with any particular voyage, which was one
of the main contentions in the case of People's Ferry Company v.
Beers, supra. It would seem that the only thing that can be said
in support of the theory that the construction of a vessel is not
maritime is, that it has never been in the water and is not licensed
and registered.
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The decision was rendered when the tendency of the Supreme
Court was to curtail the admiralty jurisdiction, while at the
present time the tendency seems to be in the opposite direction,
and one might reason that in view of The Blackheath, ('95
U. S. 361, 49 L. Ed. 236,) which has upset the practice of this
country for more than forty years, that admiralty had no juris-
diction of an action that was consummated upon land, holding that
in the case of a beacon light affixed to piles driven into the bottom
of a river and being damaged by a vessel, an action for such
damages was cognizable in admiralty. Mr. Justice Brown, in
concurring in this opinion, said: "I accept this case as practically
overruling the former ones, and as recognizing the principles
adopted by the English admiralty court jurisdiction act of 186i
(sec. 7), extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to 'any
claim for damages by any ship.' This has been held in many cases
to include damage done to a structure affixed to the land. The
distinction between the damage done to fixed and floating struc-
tures is a somewhat artificial one, and, in my view, founded upon
no sound principle; and the fact that Congress, under the Consti-
tution cannot extend our admiralty jurisdiction affords an argu-
ment for a broad interpretation commensurate with the needs of
modem commerce. To attempt to draw the line of jurisdiction
between different kinds of fixed structures as, for instance, be-
tween beacons and wharves, would lead to great confusion and
much further litigation."
It might be reasonably argued from this that should a case
now be brought before the Court for the construction of a vessel,
admiralty might take jurisdiction of it.
Another interesting case is that of Perry v. Haines, (ii, U. S.
18, 46 L. Ed. 73,) which was a case for repairs to a canal boat while
she was engaged in navigating the Erie canal. In this case it
was attempted to enforce a lien under a state statute in the state
courts of New York. This statute provided that upon the
written application to a justice of the Supreme Court of New
York, a warrant would issue for the seizure of a vessel and an
order to show cause why she should not be sold to satisfy the
lien-the contention being in this case that the Erie canal was
not within the admiralty jurisdiction but an inland canal of the
state and therefore the state courts had exclusive jurisdiction.
The Court held that the Erie canal was part of the great water
ways of the country and it would be anomalous to say that a vessel
was subject to the admiralty jurisdiction when in the Hudson river
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but when passing through the canal was not subject to such juris-
diction but was subject to the admiralty jurisdiction again upon
entering Lake Erie, and held that the State Statute, in attempting
to provide for a process in rem to enforce the lien against a
vessel in the state court, was in violation of the Constitution. If
this statute has provided for the giving of a lien to a domestic
vessel and then provided for its enforcement in admiralty it would
come within the recognized principle established in The Lottawanna,
supra.
The case of The Glide, (167 U. S. 6o6, 4:2 L. Ed. 296,) arose
under a Massachusetts statute which gave a lien on all vessels
for construction, repairs and supplies, when such supplies,
construction or repairs were contracted for, either expressly or im-
pliedly, with the agent or owners of the vessel. The "Glide" was
a tug boat owned in the District of Massachusetts and had been
repaired at the port of Boston. Suit was brought and upheld in
the state court under this statute to enforce the lien for repairs.
The case was taken by a writ of error to the Supreme Court of
the United States where, in an order by Mr. Justice Gray, it was
held that a state statute giving a lien and providing for its en-
forcement in a state court in the nature of a proceeding in rem
was unlawful and in violation of the exclusive jurisdiction of
admiralty as provided by the Constitution.
While the question was not before the Court as to whether this
statute would be good so far as giving a lien is concerned, if
one should enforce such lien in the admiralty courts, it would
seem reasonable that such would be the interpretation, for it is
within the province of states to provide for liens, but such
liens must be enforced in admiralty. It would seem unreason-
able to say that just because the state has provided for an un-
lawful means of carrying out the liens, that where a lien is given
one may not use the lien and select a proper forum.
It will be noticed that this Massachusetts statute did not offend
as some of them have, notably the State of Washington statute,
in giving a lien, unqualified against foreign vessels, for it pro-
vided for a lien only when it was contracted for with the owners
of the vessel or with their agents, and the theory of the admiralty
law has always been that there is no lien, that is by implication.
against a foreign vessel, if the owners are present even though
she is in a foreign port, for the presumption is that the contract
is upon the personal credit of such owner or agent and the vessel
is not in need of assistance.
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The Moses Taylor, (4 Wall. 411, 18 L. Ed. 207,) was a case
brought under a California statute, which provided for a process
in rein in the state court against any vessel for supplies and
materials furnished for the use or repair and for breach of con-
'tract for transportation of persons or property. The "Taylor"
was a vessel whose home port was New York and was employed in
navigating the Pacific ocean and carrying passengers and freight
between Panama and San Francisco. While employed in such
trade, the owner of the steamer contracted to carry a passenger in
the steerage from New York to San Francisco, and for the breach
of this contract an action was brought under the state statute in
San Francisco. Upon a writ of error from the United States
States Court to the highest court of California it was held that
inasmuch as the contract for carrying a passenger was to be per-
formed upon the high seas and had to do with commerce and
navigation, it was a maritime contract and should be enforced in
the federal courts. Mr. Justice Field, who wrote the opinion,
in commenting upon the saving clause of the 9 th section
of the judiciary act, said the following: "That clause only saves
to suitors the right of a common law remedy, where the common
law is competent to give it. It is not a remedy in the common
law courts which is saved, but a common law remedy. A proceed-
ing in rein as used in the admiralty court is not a remedy afforded
by the common law; it is a proceeding under the civil law. When
used in the common law courts, it is given by 'statute."
It would seem that under this statute if the plaintiff had merely
brought an action in the state court for a breach of contract and
attached the steamer as the property of the defendant, assuming
that some statute of California gave such right of action, that he
would have had a right of action in a common law court, assuming
of course, that the vessel was within the jurisdiction of California.
The Ad. Hine, (4 Wall. 555, 18 L. Ed. 451,) was a case
brought under an Iowa statute providing for proceedings in rein
in the state court in case of an injury to persons or property by
vessel, officers or crew. The "Hine" had been in collision on the
Mississippi River near St. Louis with steamer "Sunshine" and
proceedings were brought against her in the state court under the
statute. The owners of the "Hine" interposed a plea to the juris-
diction of the state court and the point was overruled, which de-
cision overruling the plea was affirmed by the highest court in
the state. The case before the Supreme Court of the United
States upon a writ of error and it was -held that inasmuch as the
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state court of Iowa attempted to enforce a proceeding in rem
against a vesel which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of ad-
miralty, the statute was unconstitutional.
The suit for the collision, so far as the proceeding
in rem was concerned, was clearly within the jurisdiction of the
admiralty courts, even though such collision did occur within the
waters of the State of Iowa and such statute attempting to
give proceedings in rem was unconstitutional.
In this case if a tort action had been brought in the state
court of Iowa attaching the vessel as the property of her owners,
whoever they might be, and not taking any proceedings against
the vessel, such action might be maintained in the saving clause of
the judiciary act.
In The Belfast, (9 Wall. 643,) a statute of Alabama was up
for interpretation which attempted to give a lien upon a vessel
under a contract of affreightment. It was held unconstitutional
in so far as it provided for the enforcement of a lien in the state
court by proceedings in rem because the lien was a maritime lien,
the state courts having no authority to hear and determine a suit
in rem in admiralty to enforce maritime matters.
The State of Illinois passed some statutes attempting to give
mortages against a vessel priority over claims for supplies. The
Supreme Court of the United States in commenting upon this
statute (The Rumbell, 148 U. S., 37 L. Ed. 345,) said: "Any
priority given by a state statute or by decisions, at common law
or in equity to a mortgage upon a vessel as against a claim for
supplies and necessaries furnished to the vessel at her home port,
is immaterial; and that the admiralty courts of the United States
enforcing a lien because it is maritime in its nature, arising upon
a maritime contract, must give it the rank to which it is entitled
by the principles of admiralty and maritime law."
There is no question but that the states may provide for an
action against the owners of a domestic vessel with the power of
attachment. This would be analogous to an action in personam
in admiralty with a foreign attachment. The distinction is that
an action against the vessel itself is exclusively within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction and cannot be infringed upon by any
state laws.
It is true in the case of Edwards v. Elliott, (21 Wall. 502,)
a state statute of New Jersey giving a right of action to enforce
a lien against the building of a vessel was upheld. But it was
upheld upon the ground that admiralty had no jurisdiction to
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enforce a contract for the building of a vessel. If, as suggested
above, admiralty should take cognizance of contracts for the build-
ing of vessels a state statute in this regard would be likewise
objectionable. In states where there are no statutes providing for
liens against domestic vessels for repairs and supplies no action can
be brought in rem against the vessel for such supplies unless by
agreement, the theory of the admiralty law being that all sup-
plies contracted for in the home port of the vessel are upon the
credit of her owner and the only action one would have in ad-
miralty would be in personam.
The State of Connecticut has statutes (Section 416o-416i),
which provide in a general way for a lien for a claim of more
than $2o.oo for materials and services rendered in the construction
or repair of any vessel, providing the person rendering such
services and furnishing such materials shall, within ten days after
rendering such services or furnishing such materials, file in the
town clerk's office where the services were rendered or materials
furnished, a certificate of lien on the vessel, giving name of vessel.
if known, when he commenced to work or furnished materials,
and the name of the owner or agent, if known to him, and leave a
copy of such certificate with the owner or agent, if either is known
to him to have a residence in this state. They also provide that
this lien may be enforced like a mortgage on personal property.
These statutes, it will be seen, make no distinction between foreign
and domestic vessels and provide for a lien enforceable in the state
court against a vessel itself. These statutes never having been
before the courts, it is of course difficult to say just what in-
terpretation would be placed upon them, but from the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court it would seem reasonable that
the statutes, if valid at all, would be so only in so far as they apply
to the construction of vessels or repairs of domestic vessels en-
forced to admiralty, for if an attempt should be made to enforce
them for the repairs on a foreign vessel they would be in direct
violation of the Roanoke, supra; and if for the repairs of the
domestic vessel in a rem proceeding in the state courts in direct
violation of Perry v. Haines, supra; in violation of the decision
in the Roanoke for the admiralty given an action for the repairs
of a foreign vessel and no state statute can intrude upon its
jurisdiction; in the violation of Perry v. Haines, for it would be an
attempt to enforce a lien for repairs in reim in the state courts
which proceeding is exclusively in the admiralty.
These Connecticut statutes in so far as they attempt to give
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a lien against domestic vessels for supplies and repairs would
probably be upheld if the enforcement of such liens should be
prosecuted in the admiralty courts, for the only thing objectionable
in these statutes, so far as it applies to repairs and supplies against
domestic vessels in the forum which the statutes give for enforcing
such liens.
The statutes so far as they apply to the construction of a
vessel would probably be upheld, following the case of Edwards
v. Elliott, supra.
But this, of course, is subject to what I have said above, that
at the present time the Supreme Court seems to be inclined to en-
large the admiralty jurisdiction and might, should a case be
brought before it, take jurisdiction of the construction of a vessel
and if so the statutes at this point, so far as giving a rem pro-
ceeding is concerned, enforceable in the state courts, would be
just as objectionable as they are in the other two.
An interesting case arose recently in the United States Dis-
trict Court for Connecticut and is a good illustration of how far
the federal courts will go in applying the broad doctrines of
admiralty to contracts for constructing vessels, although not tech-
nically within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. In this
case a shipbuilder had contracts for building five four-masted
schooners. When the schooners were partly completed, being in
various stages of construction, one just launched and tied at the
dock, three of the others in frame ready to ceil and the other the
keel just laid, the shipbuilder becoming financially embarrassed,
some of his creditors brought suit against him and attached all
of these vessels as his property, putting a keeper in charge of the
yard and one on board the schooner "George F. Scannell," which
had been launched. The shipbuilder filed a petition in bankruptcy
and his trustee took possession of these schooners and had them
appraised as the property of the bankrupt. These schooners had
all been built under the regular shipbuilding contracts,, which pro-
vided among other things for the making of partial payments by
the subscribing owners' at certain stages of construction of the
schooners and upon such payments being made, that the title to
the schooners as they then were should vest in the subscribing
owners. The payments on these various schooners had been made
according to the terms of the contracts. The owners of these
schooners filed petitions for the reclamation in bankruptcy which
is in the nature of a libel for possession in admiralty. It was
claimed in behalf of the trustee that by the state law of Connecticut
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the possession of personal property on the part of the vendor
after payment, is fraudulent as to creditors; but the court,
following the doctrine laid down by judge Butler in the Poco-
noket (67 F. R. 262, affirmed 7o F. R. 640, 17 C. C. A. 309),
which was an action in admiralty for the possession of a vessel
built upon a contract similar to the ones under which these
schooners were being constructed, held that the title to these
schooners under these contracts was in the subscribing owners
and ordered them to return to such owners. (In re MacDonald,
138, F. R., 463.)
The comment on section 416o of the statutes applying to liens
in Connecticut is very misleading to practitioners, for while it
starts off by saying that a state statute can give lien for materials
and supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port, it closes by
saying, "but the United States Supreme Court in 1858 refused to
exercise its power for the future and repealed their former rule
authorizint such libels." This of course, is not so; for in 1872
the Supreme Court amended its rule allowing material, men for
supplies and repairs or other necessaries to proceed against the
ship and freight in rem, or against the master or owner in personam,
and the state statutes giving a lien for supplies and repairs furnish-
ed a domestic vessel in her home port, may enforce such lien in
admiralty. This change in 1872 practically brought the law back
to where it was in i844.
I spoke above of liens by agreement on domestic vessels
where the statutes of the state in the home port of the vessel make
no provisions for a lien.
The presumption in admiralty is against a lien upon a do-
mestic vessel for supplies, repairs, etc., the same as it is against
a lien upon a foreign vessel for like contracts, when the owner
is present. But where a state statute gives a lien such presumption
is overcome and the lien is of equal rank with a foreign lien.
(The Amos D. Carver, 35 F. R. 665.)
This class of liens by agreement has crept into the admiralty
practice in the United States, that is, the giving of a lien on do-
mestic vessels where there is no state statute providing for such
lien, and a lien on foreign vessels when the owner is
present. In neither of these cases is there any presumption for
a lien. In fact the presumption is against a lien and the burden
of proof is upon the person asserting such a lien to show that the
minds of the parties met on a common understanding that a lien
should be created. It is not enough for the one who furnishes the
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supplies to have charged them to the vessel nor to say that he
wouldn't have given the credit except upon the belief that he was
to have a lien. Whether these liens created by agreement are of
equal rank with liens that the admiralty presumes, is a question.
But it is believed that at the present time such liens would be so
held in the United States.
The rule is just the opposite where the law presumes a lien, that
is, where the master obtains necessary supplies in a foreign port
and in such a case the one disputing such a lien would have the
burden in overcoming this presumption. (The Surprise, 129, F.
R. C. C. A., 1st Circuit, 873.)
This presumption against a lien for supplies furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port upon contract wth the owners is materially
changed where it is shown that the owner is insolvent and unworthy
of credit in such cases, instead of requiring the ones asserting
such liens to assume the burden of proof, the law will imply that
any personal credit of the owner instead of the vessel was improb-
able. (The Newport, 1O7, F. R. 744. Aff. so far as question of
credit of vessel was concerned, 114 F. R. C. C. A., 2nd Circuit, 713.)
Another curious attempt at state court interference with the
jurisdiction of the United States courts is the attempt to collect
certain fees by harbor masters and port wardens in the nature of
services rendered vessels. These fees frequently attempt to charge
the vessels a certain amount per annum based upon their registered
tonnage. A statute of this kind has only recently been before
the United States District Court of New York in the case of
Way (Harbor Master of the Port of Albany), v. The New Jersey
Steamboat Company 133 F. R., 188. The statute provides: "That
the master, owner or consignee of either steamboat or vessel,
entering the Port of Albany, or loading or unloading, or making
fast to any wharf therein, shall, within forty-eight hours there-
after, pay to the harbor master for his services the sum of one and
one-half cents per ton per annum which shall be computed upon
the registered tonnage of such steamboat or vessel." Upon the
refusal of the steamboat company to pay such fees an action in
admiralty was brought to recover the same. The Court, in render-
ing its decision, held that the statute was unconstitutional, as it
attempted to impose a tonnage tax in violation of Article i, Sec.
io, of the Constitution. It was attempted in behalf of the libellant
to uphold this statute, inasmuch as it provided that a fee should be
paid for services rendered by the harbor master and in this way
distinguished it from the case of The Inman Steamship Company
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v. Tinker (94 U. S., 238, 24 L. Ed. 118), which was a case deciding
a statute in New York, similar to this, to be unconstitutional
because of its attempting to collect tonnage tax. The statute as
then prevailing did not say anything about any services rendered
by the harbor master, but made it incumbent upon vessels to pay
upon being docked, a certain tax which was held in this case to
be in the nature of a tonnage tax. But the Court held that there
was no material difference in the statutes and that the statute as
at present enacted was just as objectionable as the old statute and
dismissed the libel.
Section 4765 of the general statutes of Connecticut, which is
as follows: "The person in charge of each vessel of a draft of
more than six feet and of over fifty tons burden, carrying cargoes
to the city of Hartford from any port or place beyond the mouth
of the Connecticut river, and of each steamer engaged in towing
on said river, shall report to the port warden of the city of Hart-
ford within twenty-four hours after each arrival at said city,
stating the name and registered tonnage of such vessel or steamer,
and shall pay to him for each vessel carrying cargoes, and for each
steamer engaged in towing, a toll of two cents a ton upon its
registered tonnage, except that where the actual weight of the
cargo can be determined by its bills of lading, such toll shall be
imposed on said actual tonnage, at the rate of one cent a ton. The
Hartford and New York Transportation Company shall, on the
first day of June in each year, pay to said port warden one thousand
dollars, in lieu of all tolls imposed by this section. The person
in charge of any such vessel or steamer, and the owner, shall be
jointly and severally liable for such toll; and if the person in
charge shall neglect so to report and to pay toll, after demand by
said port warden, he and the owner of such vessel or steamer
shall be jointly and severally liable to pay double the amount of
such toll; and the city court of said city shall have jurisdiction of
all suits instituted for the recovery thereof;" seems to be similar to
the New York statute in the form in which it was when it was
interpreted in the case of the Inman Steamship Company v. Tinker,
supra, and should it come before the federal courts it would un-
doubtedly be declared unconstitutional.
This Connecticut statute, while similar to the New York
statute, has one other objectionable feature, inasmuch as it also
attempts to tax vessels coming from other states, as it will be
noticed that it provides for this tonnage tax on vessels carrying
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cargoes to the city of Hartford from any port or place beyond the
mouth of the Connecticut river.
It must be apparent from this that no state statutes, even
though they may be upheld by the court of their respective
states, can in any way interfere or abrogate the principles of
maritime law.
A very interesting case on similar question is that of Work-
inan v. Mayor of New York et al, 179 U. S., 553, 45 L. Ed. 314,
and points out clearly that admiralty will not permit any inter-
ference with its exclusive jurisdiction. In this case a fire boat
belonging to the city of New York ran into and damaged a
barkentine tied up to a wharf. There was a fire raging at the
time and the fire boat was hurrying to assist in putting out the fire.
This case was brought by the owners of the barkentine in the
admiralty court against the mayor and other officials of New York,
which action was upheld by the district court. The circuit court
of appeals reversed the district court and the case was taken by a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice White, held that the
maritime law and not the local law governed in determining the
liability of the city for injury to a vessel by one of its fire boats.
This, of course, is entirely contrary to the local law which absolves
a municipality for injury done in performing a public service for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of a community. The Court
did not decide whether an action could be maintained against the
fire boat in rem or whether one would have to proceed in like
cases in. personam, but seems to admit that an action in rem.
could be brought. The reason for this decision must be obvious,
for if foreign vessels coming into our ports should be damaged by
one class of vessels with no right of action and by another class of
vessels where there would be no action, the general maritime law
of the world would be so changed and upset that it would not answer
the purpose for which it has been developed through a long period
of years.
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